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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARY DAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 930135-CA
Priority No. 15

v.
STATE OF UTAH,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

APPELLEES' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Pursuant to this Court's order dated March 29, 1994, the State
and City Appellees submit the following joint brief in response to
Points I and II of Day's Reply Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DAY'S
CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE
TO
THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT FAILS BECAUSE SHE
SEEKS A REMEDY AGAINST THE STATE WHICH IS
UNPROTECTED BY THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE
Day seeks a remedy against the state that is unprotected by
the open courts clause; therefore, her constitutional challenge to
the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act

(the

"Act") fails.

Day

challenges section 63-30-7(2) of the Act, which she contends
deprives her of a statutory remedy against the state that was
provided as a "substitute" for a common law remedy she claims
existed against Trooper Colyar.
reasons.

This challenge fails for several

First, as discussed in detail in Point II below, the
1

premise that Day had a common law remedy against Trooper Colyar is
erroneous.

However, this Court need not reach the issue of the

common law immunity of Trooper Colyar because, as discussed in
Point I.A. below, the alleged "substitute" remedy Day seeks against
the state never in fact existed.

Furthermore, as discussed in

Point I.B. below, even if such a "substitute" remedy existed, the
open courts clause affords no protection of the remedy Day seeks
against the state.
A.

The So-Called "Substitute" Remedy Day Seeks Against The
State Never Existed Under The Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.

Day's open courts challenge to section 63-30-7(2) fails
because her premise that the Governmental Immunity Act previously
provided a remedy against the state for her injuries is incorrect.
As discussed at pages 24-25 of the State's opening brief, section
63-30-7 was originally enacted in 1965 as part of the original Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.
As originally enacted, sections 63-30-3 and 63-30-7 of the Act
retained governmental immunity for the operation of emergency
vehicles. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3 & -7 (1968) . Original section
63-30-3 provided:

"Except as may be otherwise provided in this

act, all governmental entities shall be immune from suit for any
injury which may result from the activities of said entities
wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a
governmental function."

Original section 63-30-7 provided:

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation
2

by any employee of a motor vehicle or other equipment
while in the scope of his employment; provided, however,
that this section shall not apply to the operation of
emergency vehicles as defined by law and while being
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 416-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 86,
Laws of Utah, 1961.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7 (1968) (emphasis added) . See 1965 Laws of
Utah 139, attached as Addendum A.

Since the waiver of immunity

provided under section 63-30-7 did not apply to injuries caused by
the operation of emergency vehicles, the general immunity provision
of section 63-3 0-3 did apply.

Thus, under the original Act,

governmental entities were immune from liability for injuries
caused by the operation of emergency vehicles such as the injuries
for which Day seeks recovery in this case.
In 1990, section 63-30-7 was amended to add subsection (2),
which provided as follows:
(2)(a)
All governmental entities employing peace
officers retain and do not waive immunity from liability
for civil damages for personal injury or death or for
damages to property resulting from the collision of a
vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator
of the law who is being, has been, or believes he is
being or has been pursued by a peace officer employed by
the governmental entity in a motor vehicle.
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor
imply that this immunity was ever previously waived or
this liability specifically or implicitly recognized.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).

As

stated in subsection 2(b), the 1990 amendment of section 63-30-7
was expressly not intended to change the existing law concerning
the state's liability for injuries caused by collisions with
vehicles under police pursuit.

In fact, the 1990 amendment was

intended merely to clarify the legislature's original intent in the
3

face of a perceived legal trend in California to assert claims for
injuries arising from such collisions. See Senate debate, Senator
Richard J. Carling, S.B. 194, February 14, 1990.
Therefore, contrary to Day's contention, the state has always
been immune from Day's claims and no remedy against the state has
ever been provided -- as a "substitute" for a common law remedy
against government employees or otherwise -- for Day's claims.
This Court should therefore reject Day's contention that she
was unconstitutionally deprived of such a substitute remedy and
affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing Day's claims.
B.

The Open Courts Clause Does Not Protect The Remedy Day
Seeks Against The State

1.

The open courts clause
to create a substitute

does not require
remedy

the

state

Even if such a substitute remedy for Day's injuries ever
existed against the state under the Act, it would not be protected
by the open courts clause.1

While the open courts clause may

invalidate a statute that abrogates a common law remedy, and an
open courts challenge to a statute may be defeated by a showing
that an adequate substitute or alternative remedy exists, the open
*As discussed in Point VII of the State's opening brief,
absent an open courts violation, the constitutionality of section
63-30-7 must be measured under a minimum scrutiny test and the
burden remains on Day to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of
section 63-30-7. See McCorvey v. Utah State Dep't of Transp. 225
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah November 11, 1993) ("Because no right
existed at common law . . . , the legislature is free to limit the
state's liability in that area without implicating the open courts
clause and its concomitant heightened scrutiny."). Day has not
analyzed section 63-30-7 under a minimum scrutiny test in either
her opening or reply brief. Therefore, her due process and equal
protection claims should also be rejected.
4

courts

clause does not, as Day would

have

it, require the

legislature to provide such a substitute remedy.
As first set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp.. Ill

P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), a two-part analysis

applies to challenge to a statute under the open courts clause:
First, section 11 [the open courts clause] is satisfied
if the law provides an injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for
vindication of his constitutional interest. . . .
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of
action may be justified only if there is a clear social
or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
Id. at 680.

If neither an adequate substitute remedy nor a

sufficient justification for the abrogation of the original remedy
is found, then the statute abrogating the original remedy is
invalid.

Thus, in Berry, the Utah Supreme Court held the product

liability statute of repose unconstitutional where no substitute
remedy was provided for the existing remedy abrogated by the
statute and where no adequate

justification existed

for the

abrogation of the existing remedy.
Conversely, where a substitute for a pre-existing remedy is
available, no open courts violation can be established.

Thus, in

Payne v. Mvers, 743 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1987), the Court rejected
the plaintiffs' open courts challenge to section 63-30-4(4) of the
Governmental Immunity Act where the Act provided a remedy against
the state for their negligence claim and the plaintiffs had failed
to file a notice of claim against the state.
5

Under the Berry analysis, the "constitutional interest" or
"existing remedy" protected by the open courts clause in this case
is Day's claimed common law remedy against Trooper Colyar.

The

only provision of the Act which would affect such a remedy is
section

63-30-4(4),

which

limits

the

personal

liability

of

government employees to circumstances involving fraud or malice.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) (1993).
Under Berry, if section 63-30-4(4) abrogated an existing
common law remedy against Trooper Colyar, and if (1) no adequate
substitute remedy were provided by the Act and (2) no sufficient
justification existed for the abrogation of the existing remedy,
then section 63-30-4(4) would be unconstitutional under the open
courts clause.2

In those circumstances, aside from any question

of the severability of section 63-30-4(4) from the Act, Day's preexisting common law remedy against the law enforcement officers
would in effect be reinstated.
Rather

than pursuing

any

remedy

against

Trooper

Colyar

personally, however, Day apparently prefers the deep pocket of the
state.

Thus, Day contends that the open courts clause obligates

the legislature to retain an alleged substitute remedy against the
state. This argument is a radical departure from any existing open
courts case law and is unsupported even by dicta from any such case

2

Because Day does not challenge the constitutionality of
section 63-30-4(4), defendants do not address here the validity of
that provision under the open courts clause.
6

law.3
Contrary to Day's contention, the Utah Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that "[a]rticle I, section 11 does not
guarantee a right to sue the state when it acts in a governmental
function." McCorvev v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 225 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting).
See also id. at 6 ("Because no right existed at common law to
recover from the state for injuries arising out of the state's
maintenance of public roadways, the legislature is free to limit
the state's liability in that area without implicating the open
courts

clause

and

its

concomitant

heightened

scrutiny.");

Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 372 (Utah 1989)
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("The [governmental function] test also
identifies where the constitutional right of a person to have a
remedy for personal injury begins under Article I, section 11 of
the Utah Constitution as against a governmental agency, and where
the governmental right to immunity from such lawsuits stops.")
As

conceded

by

Day,

Trooper

Colyar

was

engaged

in a

governmental function in pursuing and continuing to pursue Floyd.
Thus, the open courts clause in no way limits the legislature's
power to define the state's liability under the circumstances of
this case. Where Day cannot gain access to the taxpayers resources
through the front door, her attempt to obtain such access through
3

It is precisely because this novel argument is such a radical
departure from any previous open courts analysis seen by the State
that the State could not have reasonably anticipated it from the
mere fact that Day raised an open courts clause challenge to the
Act in her opening brief.
7

the back door should be rejected.

To require the legislature
to provide a
substitute
remedy would usurp the legislative
function

2.

Moreover, to require the legislature to provide a substitute
remedy against the state, even under the authority of the open
courts clause, would be to usurp legislative power and violate the
principles of judicial restraint and separation of powers.
I!

Utah Constitution provides that
State

shall

be

vested

.

.

The

[t]he Legislative power of the

.

[i]n

a

Senate

and

House

of

Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of the
State of Utah."

Utah Const., art. VI, section 1.

further expressly provides that

The Constitution

fl

[t]he powers of the government of

the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments,
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to
either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed
or permitted."

The

principle

of

separation

of

powers

is

a

cornerstone of our system government at both the federal and state
levels and the source of the doctrine of judicial restraint.
State

v.

Bell,

785

P.2d

390, 397-98

(Utah

1989);

Jensen

See
v.

Matheson, 583 P.2d 77, 79 (Utah 1978); Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah
2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 380-81 (1970).
Here, even under Day's theory of the case, the legislature has
clearly expressed its desire not to provide a statutory remedy
against the state.

It is far outside the realm of judicial power

to require the legislature to provide otherwise.
8

3,

The exception
to the state's
immunity provided by
section 63-30-7 is inseverable
from the remainder
of the Act

Furthermore, even if this Court were to hold that section 6330-7(2) violates the open courts clause as urged by Day, that
provision

is

Governmental

inseverable
Immunity Act.

from

the

Where

remainder
part

of

an

of

the

Utah

enactment

is

unconstitutional, the severability question is primarily answered
by determining legislative intent.

Berry, 717 P.2d at 687; Salt

Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791
(Utah 1977).

To do so, the court must ask whether the balance of

the enactment, other than the portion struck down, can stand alone
and serve its legitimate legislative purpose. Utah Technology Fin.
Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 414 (Utah 1986); Berry, 717 P.2d
at 687; State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In this case, the Governmental Immunity Act legislatively
adopted sovereign immunity, then waived that immunity in some
circumstances, subject to certain exceptions.
constituted one of those exceptions.

Section 63-30-7(2)

Those exceptions, including

section 63-30-7(2), are an integral part of the enactment and are,
therefore, not severable. Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of
Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 791; Berry, 717 P.2d at 686 (striking
down entire Utah Product Liability Act as inseverable where section
setting forth statute of repose violated open courts clause). The
waiver of immunity and the exceptions to that waiver constitute a
package and are inextricably interrelated. In such a circumstance,
"it is not within the scope of the court's function to select the
9

valid portions of the act and make conjecture the legislature
intended they should stand independent of the portions which are
invalid."

Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters,

563 P.2d at 791.
In any event, the legislative history of the Governmental
Immunity Act, and particularly that of sections 63-30-3 and -7 as
discussed in Point I.A. above, rules out any such conjecture. The
Utah legislature plainly did not intend that the waiver provision
of 63-30-7(1) would apply to a plaintiff

in Day's position.

Standing alone, the waiver provision cannot serve the legislature's
purposes in enacting the Governmental Immunity Act.

Accordingly,

if this Court holds section 63-30-7(2) unconstitutional, the
balance of the Act must also be invalidated.
Absent any valid statutory waiver of sovereign immunity and
statutory right of action, Day's ability to sue or recover from the
state is controlled by the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
(Utah

Under Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348

1989)

and

McCorvey

v.

Utah

State

Department

of

Transportation, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah November 10, 1993),
there is no common law right of action to recover anything from a
governmental entity for injuries arising out of a governmental
function.

Day has conceded that Trooper Colyar was engaged in a

governmental function in pursuing, and continuing to pursue, Floyd.
Accordingly, Day has no common law claim against the state, and the
judgment of the district court dismissing Day's claims must be
affirmed.
10

In short, there is no "substitute" remedy under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act for the common law remedy Day claims
existed against Trooper Colyar.

Moreover, the open courts clause

does not require the legislature to provide such a substitute
remedy against the state.

Furthermore, such a requirement would

violate the fundamental precepts of separation of powers and
judicial restraint.

In any event, the exception to the Act's

waiver of immunity contained in section 63-30-7(2) is inseverable
from the remaining provisions of the Act and any ruling that
section 63-30-7(2) is unconstitutional would require striking down
the entire Act.

Under the common law applicable to Day's claims,

Day would have no remedy against the State. Therefore, this Court
must affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing Day's claims.
POINT II
DAY HAD NO COMMON LAW REMEDY AGAINST TROOPER
COLYAR BECAUSE UNDER THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE
OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY, TROOPER COLYAR WAS
IMMUNE FROM DAY'S CLAIMS
In pursuing, and continuing to pursue, Floyd, Trooper Colyar
was performing a discretionary function for which he was immune at
common law.

Therefore, notwithstanding the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act, Day never had a remedy against Trooper Colyar.
At common law, under the doctrine of official immunity, courts
granted public employees such as Trooper Colyar extensive immunity
from liability
employment.

for actions taken within

the scope of their

See, e.g.. Kendall v. Stokes. 44 U.S. 87 (1845)

(holding postmaster general immune from liability for writing off
debt owed to plaintiff); Hiorth v. Whittenburq, 121 Utah 324, 241
11

P.2d 907, 909 (1952) (holding state road commissioners immune from
liability for property damages caused by decision to raise grade of
road); Hicks v. Davis. 163 P. 799 (Utah 1917) (state auditor immune
from liability for refusing to determine validity of claim against
state); Garff v. Smith. 31 Utah 102, 86 P. 772
state

sheep

inspector

immune

from

liability

(1906)
for

(holding

negligently

ordering sheep quarantined under conditions that allegedly caused
their death).
Such immunity was based on the courts' recognition that a
lawsuit against a governmental employee was often in effect a
lawsuit against the state, and that, if held personally liable for
their official judgments, responsible individuals would either be
discouraged

from

accepting

public

employment

intimidated in carrying out their duties.

or

be

unduly

See, e.g., Hiorth v.

Whittenburg, 241 P.2d at 909 (stating public officials are immune
from

liability

for

discretionary

decisions,

"otherwise

public

officials would be fearful to act at the risk of finding themselves
personally liable for acts done in good faith in the performance of
their duties."); Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W. 2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992)
(en banc)

("[T]he community imposes a duty on its governmental

bodies and law enforcement officials to provide its citizens with
security in person and property from lawless people, and this duty,
on

occasion,

necessarily

will

involve

high-speed

car chases.

Official immunity is provided because the community cannot expect
its police officers to do their duty and then to second-guess them
when they attempt conscientiously to do it.
12

To expose police

officers to civil liability whenever a third person might be
injured would, we think tend to exchange prudent caution for
timidity

in

the

already

difficult

job

of

responsible

law

enforcement.")
One widely-applied type of official immunity at common law was
based on the distinction between discretionary and ministerial
functions.

(Other common law immunity doctrines included the

absolute immunity granted judicial officers and the good faith
immunity generally accorded prison officials. See, e.g., Sheffield
v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 316-17, 445 P.2d 367, 369 (1968)
(holding prison officials immune from negligence claims absent a
wilful or malicious wrongful act).)

Under the discretionary-

versus-ministerial function analysis, an official was held liable
only for ministerial acts, but not for acts which required the
exercise of discretion or judgment.

See Fleming James, Jr., Tort

Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 610, 643

(1955)

("The

rule of immunity of officers for

discretionary acts, and its extension, represent a judgment that
the benefits to be had from the personal liability of the officer
(especially since the prospect of actual compensation to the victim
from that source is slight) are outweighed by the evils that would
flow from a wider rule of liability.").
For example, in Hiorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d
907,

909

(1952) , the

court held members of

the

state road

commission immune from liability for property damage caused by an
allegedly negligent decision to substantially raise the grade of
13

state highway 89.

In Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P. 2d 697, 699

(Utah 1977) , on the other hand, the Utah Supreme Court held a
district court clerk liable for failing to properly docket the
payment of a fine, which resulted in the issuance of a bench
warrant against and arrest of the plaintiff.
Contrary to the suggestion in Day's reply brief at page 6, the
doctrine of official immunity for discretionary acts was not a
development of the 1920's and 1930's.
well-developed

and

fully

applied

Rather, the doctrine was

around

the

time

of Utah's

statehood in 1896. Just twelve years after statehood, for example,
in Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 86 P. 772 (1906), the Utah Supreme
Court held a state sheep inspector immune from liability for
negligently

ordering

sheep quarantined

under

conditions

that

afforded insufficient food and pasture and allegedly resulted in
their death.

In so holding, the court stated:

All the authorities agree that a public officer, acting
judicially, or in a quasi judicial capacity, cannot be
made personally liable in a civil action, unless the act
complained of be willful, corrupt, or malicious, or
without the jurisdiction of the officer. But, if the
duties of the officer are merely ministerial, he is
liable in a civil action when, in the performance of
them, he acts negligently. These principles of law, of
course, are conceded by [the sheep owner].
31 Utah at 107.

Rejecting the sheep owner's argument that the

inspector's actions were ministerial in nature, the court went on
to state:
It has been well said that:
Official duty is ministerial when it is
absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
merely the execution of a set task, and when
the law which imposes it prescribes and
14

defines the time, mode and occasion of its
performance with such certainty that nothing
remains for judgment or discretion. Official
action is ministerial when it is the result of
performing a certain and specific duty arising
from fixed and designated facts. (People v.
Bertels et al. , 138 111. 322, 27 N.E. 1091
[(1891)] .)
It has also been defined as follows:
A ministerial act is one which a public
officer is required to perform upon a given
state of facts in a prescribed manner in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority
and without regard to his own judgment or
opinion concerning the priority or impropriety
of the act to be performed. (State ex rel. v.
Meier, 143 Mo. 439, 45 S.W. 306 [(1898)].)
31 Utah at 107-08 (additional citations omitted).
Under the principles applied in Garff v. Smith, Trooper
Colyar's pursuit of Floyd was clearly discretionary in nature.
Therefore, under principles of the common law at the time of
statehood, Trooper Colyar was immune from liability for Day's
claims.
These same common law principles were recently applied by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in holding a city police officer immune
from liability in a high-speed chase of a shoplifter that resulted
in the death of a seven-year old schoolboy who was struck by the
fleeing car.
banc).

Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W. 2d 38 (Minn. 1992) (en

In so holding, the court noted that

ff

[t]he discretion

involved in official immunity is different from the policymaking
type of discretion involved in discretionary function immunity
afforded governmental entities.

Official immunity involves the

kind of discretion which is exercised on an operational rather than
15

a policymaking level, and it requires something more than the
performance
omitted).

of

'ministerial' duties."

Id.

at

40

(footnote

Rejecting the parents' claim against the officer, the

court reasoned:
The decision to engage in a car chase and to
continue the chase involves the weighing of many factors.
How dangerous is the fleeing suspect and how important is
it that he be caught? To what extent may the chase be
dangerous to other persons because of weather, time of
day, road, and traffic conditions?
These and other
questions must be resolved under emergency conditions
with little time for reflection and often on the basis of
incomplete and confusing information. It is difficult to
think of a situation where the exercise of significant,
independent judgment and discretion would be more
required.
Id. at 41.
Based on the same reasoning, this Court should reject Day's
contention that she had a common law remedy against Trooper Day and
affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing Day's complaint.
The case of Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), relied
upon by Day in oral argument before this Court, is not to the
contrary.

First, Frank was decided long after the adoption of the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act and thus does not represent the
common law of Utah at the time of statehood. As stated by Justice
Stewart

in holding

the product

liability

statute

of

repose

unconstitutional in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670,
676 n. 3 (Utah 1985) , "To some extent . . . , the common law at the
time of statehood provides a measure of the kinds of legal remedies
that the framers must have had in mind (at least in scope if not in
form) for the protection of life, property, and reputation." Thus,
Day cannot rely on changes in the common law that occurred long
16

after statehood to establish a claim protected by the open courts
clause.
The holding of Frank that a state-employed psychologist was
subject to liability in malpractice represented a major departure
from the earlier common law of official immunity.

In so holding,

the court adopted and applied as a matter of common law the
definition of a discretionary function used to determine the
liability of governmental entities under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. 613 P.2d at 520.

("There thus appears no reason to

apply a different legal standard to the individual than that
applied to the government employer, even though the latter is
governed by statute and the former by common law principles . . .
It is contrary to reason to deny governmental immunity to a
public employer and then grant it to the very employee allegedly
causing the injury.")

Therefore, although the court recognized

that the Act did not directly apply to claims against government
employees, 613 P.2d at 520, the court's holding was strongly
influenced by the Act.
In interpreting the "discretionary function" exception of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Utah Supreme Court has followed
the lead of cases interpreting section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort
Claims Act.

See Doe v. Arquelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282-83 (Utah

1986) ; Little v. Div. of Family Serv. , 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983) ;
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980).

The difference in

the meaning of the term "discretionary" under the FTCA and the
common law was expressly recognized in Estate of Burks v. Ross, 438
17

F. 2d 230 (6th Cir. 1971) .

In Burks, the court rejected the

argument that a Veterans' Administration hospital administrator and
psychiatrist should be held liable for negligently permitting the
escape of a mental patient, stating:
Appellant urges that "discretion" means the same
thing in the context of executive privilege as it does
under the Tort Claims Act, where the government has been
held liable for negligence in the treatment or custodial
care of patients.
We cannot agree that "discretion" can be read so
narrowly as it is now under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which has been liberally interpreted to provide a remedy
against the government. The Act's liberal construction
ought not to be extended to limit the immunity of federal
employees. Liability of the government itself for wrongs
committed by its employees will not have the same
inhibiting effect on governmental operations as the
personal liability of an official. The Tort Claims Act
seeks to bar only those suits where the "discretion" is
that involved in the formation of policy, rather than its
operation.
Id. at 234 (emphasis added) .

Accordingly, the court held the

hospital director immune and stating, " [w]hile Doctor Ging [the
treating psychiatrist] had less discretion, nevertheless in her
diagnoses and treatment of patients and in her supervisory powers
over other employees she was vested with discretion.
entitled to immunity from suit."

Id. at 235.

She is

See also Pletan v.

Gaines, 494 N.W.2d at 40 (en banc) (observing distinction between
the discretion involved in official immunity and the policymaking
type of discretion involved in discretionary function immunity
afforded governmental entities in holding police officer immune
from liability for child's death resulting collision with fleeing
shoplifter in high-speed chase).
Accordingly, the scope of the discretionary function exception
18

as applied to governmental entities under the both the FTCA the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act was far narrower than the common law
immunity for discretionary functions accorded government employees.
Indeed, contrary to the result in Frank, courts generally found
government physicians immune at common law for medical malpractice
and similar claims. See Estate of Burks v. Ross, 438 F. 2d at 235;
see also Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976) (Army
surgeons immune from allegedly negligent performance

of gall

bladder operation on civilian); Taylor v. Glotfelty, 201 F.2d 51
(6th Cir. 1952) (prison psychiatrist immune from liability for
allegedly defamatory diagnosis of patient's mental condition).4
Therefore, Frank effected a substantial change in the common
law of official immunity as it was applied before the enactment of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Day's reliance on Frank to

establish the existence of a remedy protected by the open courts
clause is accordingly misplaced.
Neither does the case of Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925
(Utah 1977), support Day's claim of a common law remedy against
Trooper Colyar. Cornwall involved a claim against a deputy sheriff
4

Cf. Brown v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital, 395
N.W.2d 18
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(medical decisions are
discretionary and protected by governmental immunity); but see
Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977) (adopting Federal
Tort Claims Act definition of discretionary in holding Air Force
physician liable on medical malpractice claim).
As Jackson
demonstrates, the interpretation of discretionary function under
the FTCA also influenced the subsequent development of the law of
federal official immunity. On the federal level, the issue of
official immunity has been largely resolved by an amendment to the
FTCA which expressly immunizes federal employees. See Federal
Employee Liability Reform & Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 1988
Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2679.
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whose vehicle collided with the plaintiff's car.

At the time of

the collision, the deputy was traveling to the scene of an
emergency, but contrary to section 41-6-14 of the Utah Code, failed
to use his siren.

The plaintiff alleged the deputy's conduct in

failing to use either his vehicle lights or siren was "reckless,
wilful, unlawful and in excess of his authority."

Id. at 926. The

court held that these allegations "appear [] to meet the criteria of
wilfulness set forth in Sheffield v. Turner."

Id. at 927 (citing

Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 316-17, 445 P.2d 367, 369
(1968) (holding prison officials immune from negligence claims
absent a wilful or malicious wrongful act)).
The court also stated that the deputy was performing a
ministerial act.
plaintiff's

Id. at 927.

allegations

Because the court held that the

satisfied

the

Sheffield

standard

of

wilfulness or maliciousness, however, this statement was mere
dicta. Even if the statement concerning ministerial acts were not
dicta, however, it would not determine the issue here. First, the
court's opinion in Cornwall was authored by former Chief Justice
Hall, who also authored the opinion in Frank. Like Frank, Cornwall
was decided long after the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was
enacted and therefore does not represent the common law of Utah
near the time of statehood.

Justice Hall's statement in Cornwall

simply presaged the holding three years later in Frank.

As

discussed above, that holding represented a substantial departure
from the common law of official immunity near statehood.
Second, Trooper Colyar's decision to pursue and to continue to
20

pursue Floyd is clearly distinguishable from the conduct of the
deputy sheriff in Cornwall in driving to an emergency scene without
using his lights or siren as expressly required by the motor
vehicle code.

Trooper Colyar's decision was more complex, and

involved a far greater degree of judgment and discretion, than that
of the deputy sheriff in Cornwall. Therefore, even if the conduct
of the deputy sheriff in Cornwall were regarded as ministerial,
that of Trooper Colyar was still clearly discretionary. Therefore,
Cornwall does not support Day's claim that Trooper Colyar would
have been held liable for her injuries at common law.
In sum, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act did not deprive Day
of any remedy she otherwise would have had at common law against
Trooper Colyar. Under the common law doctrine of official immunity
as applied in Utah at the time of statehood, Trooper Colyar's
decision

to pursue

and

to

continue

to pursue

Floyd

was a

discretionary function for which he was granted immunity from
liability.

This Court should therefore affirm the decision below

dismissing Day's claims.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Day seeks a remedy against the State that is
unprotected by the open courts clause and therefore this Court
should reject her constitutional challenge to section 63-30-7(2) of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

First, as discussed in Point

II above, Day had no common law remedy against Trooper Colyar
personally.
Even if such a common law remedy existed, however, and that
21

remedy was abrogated by section 63-30-4(4) of the Act, the open
courts clause would not support Day's claim of a substitute remedy
against

the

state.

Contrary

to

Day's

assertion,

the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act never provided such a substitute remedy;
rather, the state has always been immune under the Act from
liability for claims arising from the operation of emergency
vehicles.

Even if the Act did provide a "substitute" remedy

against the state for Day's injuries, the open courts clause does
not require the legislature to retain such a substitute remedy.
Such a requirement would usurp the legislative function and violate
fundamental notions of judicial restraint and separation of powers.
Moreover, the exception to the state's waiver of immunity
provided by section 63-30-7 is inseverable from the remainder of
the Act.

Therefore, if this Court were to hold section 63-30-7

unconstitutional, it must strike down the entire Act.

In that

event, the state would be immune from Day's claims under the common
law sovereign immunity principles.
For all of these reasons, the judgment below dismissing Day's
claims should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of April, 1994.
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ADDENDUM

1965 LAWS OF UTAH 139

Section & General Immunity in Exercise of Governmental Functions.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental
entities shall be immune from suit for any injury which may result from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function.

Section 7. Immunity Waived: Negligent Operation of Vehicle or
Equipment by Agent—Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a
motor vehicle or other equipment while in the scope of his employment; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while being driven
in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah, 1961.

